We analyze optimal discretionary monetary policy in an endogenous sticky prices model. Similar models with exogenous sticky prices can deliver multiple equilibria. This is a necessary condition for the occurrence of expectation traps (when private agents'expectations determine the equilibrium level of in ‡ation). In our model, sticky-price …rms are allowed to switch to ‡exible pricing by paying a random cost. For plausible parametrizations, our model has a unique low-in ‡ation equilibrium. With endogenous sticky prices, the monetary authority does not validate high-in ‡ation expectations and deviates to the Friedman rule.
Introduction
Monetary economics has recently witnessed an upsurge of interest in trying to identify the causes of the large variation in in ‡ation across countries and time. One strand of this literature identi…es expectation traps as a possible explanation. In an expectation trap scenario, the high-in ‡ation episode of the 1970s in the US can be characterized as a period in which private agents expected high in ‡ation. Based on these expectations, private agents took actions to shield themselves from high in ‡ation. For example, households reduced their savings, anticipating a lower real return, and workers demanded higher nominal wages, expecting them to be worth less in real terms. The private sector's action in response to high expected in ‡ation created a dilemma for the Fed: validate private agents'expectations and deliver high in ‡ation or frustrate the high-in ‡ation expectations with a tight monetary policy and accept a recession. The Fed chose the …rst course of action. In contrast, the 1990s can be interpreted as a period of low-in ‡ation expectations, which determined a low level of actual in ‡ation. In an expectation trap scenario, the lack of commitment adds to the in ‡ation bias discussed in Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) the costs of high and variable in ‡ation driven by expectations, independently from economic fundamentals.
A necessary condition for expectation traps to exist is multiplicity of equilibria. Albanesi et al. (2003) use a cash-credit goods model à la Lucas and Stokey (1987) to show that multiple equilibria are possible in a no-commitment optimal monetary policy framework. The key assumption behind the multiplicity of equilibria is that some …rms cannot adjust their prices in response to changes in monetary policy. In this paper we relax this assumption. We argue that if sticky-prices …rms are allowed to pay menu costs to reoptimize, such costs have to be implausibly high to support multiple equilibria.
In Albanesi et al. (2003) the monetary authority is benevolent, and weighs the bene…ts and costs of in ‡ation, maximizing the utility of the representative agent. Firms have market power and produce an ine¢ ciently low level of output. Some …rms are assumed to set their prices before the monetary authority's actions. The monetary authority has an incentive to generate in ‡ation to increase output, forcing sticky-price …rms to produce more. The marginal bene…t of in ‡ation is roughly constant across in ‡ation levels. The representative household faces a cash-in-advance constraint on some of the goods it purchases. In order to buy cash goods it has to hold money and give up the interest it could earn from buying bonds. A positive interest rate distorts the allocation between cash and credit goods. The marginal cost of 2 in ‡ation can be lower than the marginal bene…t both for low and high values of in ‡ation. This can generate multiple equilibria. Albanesi et al. (2003) illustrate this possibility with numerical examples.
The assumption that some …rms cannot protect themselves in any way from the monetary authority's actions is reasonable for economies with low and stable in ‡ation. With high and volatile in ‡ation, …rms have strong incentives to revise their prices. We allow sticky-price …rms to revise their prices by paying a random …xed cost.
1 Firms with a cost lower than the expected gain will revise their price. If it is so costly to revise prices that no …rm would do so, independently of the monetary authority's actions, our model simpli…es to the model of Albanesi et al. (2003) .
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In our model, in a candidate equilibrium, sticky-and ‡exible-price …rms post the same price. Hence, in a candidate equilibrium, sticky-price …rms do not revise their price even if they have a chance to do so and the degree of price stickiness in our economy is the same as in Albanesi et al. (2003) . However, o¤ equilibrium, sticky-price …rms have incentives to revise their price by paying a menu cost. This opens the door to a pro…table deviation for the government from the supposed equilibrium. By deviating to the Friedman rule, the monetary authority can eliminate the distortion between cash and credit goods. At the same time, the relative price of sticky-price goods is high. If sticky-price …rms cannot protect themselves from the monetary authority's deviation, the distorted allocation between ‡exible-and stickyprice goods makes the deviation to the Friedman rule too costly, and the high-in ‡ation is indeed an equilibrium. If enough sticky-price …rms would reoptimize in response, the cost of deviating to the Friedman rule, and distorting the allocations across sticky-and ‡exible-price goods, is smaller than the gain. In this case our model has a unique low-in ‡ation equilibrium.
For the high-in ‡ation equilibrium to exist under the benchmark parametrization of Albanesi et al. (2003) , about ten percent of …rms in our economy should have menu costs such that they would not change their price even for a 3,650 percent increase in pro…ts. For the parametrization most favorable to the existence of multiple equilibria, the high-in ‡ation equilibrium can be supported if 7 percent of all …rms have menu costs that would prevent them from repotimizing when facing a three-fold increase in their pro…ts. Menu costs this large are orders of magnitude greater than what empirical work suggests.
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In a related paper Siu (2006) endogenizes sticky prices in the model of King and Wolman (2004) 4 and reaches similar conclusions. With reasonable price-revision costs and small in ‡ation costs unrelated to price stickiness, 5 there is a unique low-in ‡ation equilibrium.
Section 2 describes the model with endogenous sticky prices. In Section 3 we explore the properties of our models with numerical examples. We perform sensitivity analysis in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
In this section we present the economy's environment, we describe the agents' problems, and we de…ne and characterize equilibria.
Environment
Our model is populated by households, …rms, and a monetary authority. There is a continuum of …rms, each one producing a variety of goods as a monopolist.
The timing is as follows:
a fraction of …rms set their prices (P e is the average price chosen); the monetary authority chooses its policy to maximize the utility of the representative household; each sticky-price …rm draws a realization of the adjustment cost from a uniform distribution,
each sticky-price …rm decides whether to revise its price by comparing the cost and the bene…t; all the remaining private decisions are made.
The state of the economy, from the monetary authority's perspective, is given by the average price level set by the sticky-price …rms. The money 3 See Levy et al. (1997) and Bils and Klenow (2004) . 4 See King and Wolman (2004) for a discussion of the di¤erences between their model and Albanesi et al. (2003) .
5 Due to the di¤erence in timing, in our model in ‡ation is costly independently of the degree of price rigidity. growth rate is denoted by x and the corresponding policy rule by X (P e ). The state of the economy, after the monetary authority decision and the realization of the policy, shock is (P e ; x).
Households
The representative household solves the following problem:
where c t denotes aggregate consumption, composed of individual consumption goods c t (!) aggregated according to (2), and n t denotes hours worked. The parameter pins down the elasticity of substitution between individual goods, : The preferences parameters have the usual interpretation: is the discount factor, is a scale parameter pinning down the hours worked-to-leisure ratio in equilibrium, and is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion.
The household faces the following constraints 6 :
Here, z is the fraction of cash goods, c 11 and c 12 are the quantities of cash goods purchased from sticky-and ‡exible-price …rms, c 21 and c 22 are the quantities of credit goods purchased from sticky-and ‡exible-price …rms. The measures of sticky-price …rms producing cash goods and credit goods are denoted by 1 and 2 , respectively. The aggregate nominal stock of money at the beginning of each period is normalized to 1. The household can split its assets, A, into money and bonds -M and B, respectively. The gross nominal interest rate is denoted by R and the money growth rate by x. Constraint (5) states that, in order to buy cash goods, the household has to hold cash. Inequality (6) is the budget constraint. The-left hand side represents expenses for buying assets and goods. The right-hand side represents the household's revenues, stemming from labor income, interest on bonds, beginning of period's money, injections of money from the government, dividends from …rms, and lump-sum taxes (transfers) from the government.
The household's problem can be restated in a functional equation form as:
v (A; P e ; x) = max
The …rst-order conditions for the household's problem are:
where u ij denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to c ij , u n denotes the partial derivative of u with respect to n, and v 1 denotes the partial derivative of v with respect to its …rst argument. The cash-in-advance constraint can be rewritten as zP e [ 1 c 11 + (1 1 ) c 12 ] 1, and it is binding for R > 1:
Firms
Each …rm ! 2 (0; 1) has a production function y (!) = n (!), where n (!) is employment and represents the marginal productivity of labor. Firms set 6 prices as mark-ups over marginal costs:
Pro…ts are given by: 11 = P e c 11 W c 11 = (1 ) P e c 11 ; 12 = (1 )P c 12 ; 21 = (1 ) P e c 21 ; 22 = (1 )P c 22 :
The gain for sticky-price …rms from revising their price is:
i1 , i = 1; 2: All …rms for which the realized cost is smaller than i will revise their price. The marginal cash-good and credit-good …rms revising their price are determined by^ i = min [ i =b; ] i = 1; 2. The number of sticky-price …rms will be given by the fraction of …rms that were sticky minus those who choose to adjust their price:
Monetary Authority
The monetary authority chooses the current money growth rate, x, taking as given future monetary policies and the private sector allocations, in order to maximize the representative household's utility:
where v (:) is the household's value function.
Government
The government runs a balanced budget by …nancing exogenous public spending, g, with lump sum taxes, = g. Furthermore, the government rebates the price revision costs (collected from sticky-price …rms choosing to reoptimize) to the households in a lump sum fashion. 7
Equilibria
De…nition 1 A private sector equilibrium, given a monetary policy rule X (P e ) and a current money growth rate x, is a collection of functions P e ,P (P e ; x), W (P e ; x) ; v (A; P e ; x) ; n (A; P e ; x), c ij (A; P e ; x) j; i = 1; 2; M (A; P e ; x), A 0 (A; P e ; x), R (P e ; x) such that:
n; M; A 0 ; fc i;j g i;j=1;2 solve the household's problem (7); …rms optimize, i.e., they set prices according to (10) and (11);
the number of sticky-price …rms is determined by (12); markets clear:
A 0 (1; P e ; x) = 1; M (1; P e ; x) = 1;
De…nition 2 A Markov equilibrium is a private sector equilibrium and a monetary policy rule such that X (P e ) solves (13) :
Characterizing Equilibria
The policy can be characterized as a choice of the price of credit goodsP , or equivalently of the relative price q =P P e ; rather than a choice of the money growth rate x. 7 Since q does not a¤ect future allocations, the monetary authority faces a static problem:
A Markov equilibrium corresponds to P e =P , or equivalently to q = 1. Notice that, as in Albanesi et al. (2003) , the …rst-order conditions to (14) are only necessary for an equilibrium. In practice, the monetary authority objective function has to be checked globally to rule out possible pro…table deviations from the candidate equilibria identi…ed by the …rst-order conditions.
Our model boils down to the model of Albanesi et al. (2003) for b ! +1, i.e., 1 = 2 = 8q. If it is prohibitively costly to revise prices, no …rms choose to do so, and the degree of price stickiness can be thought of as exogenous. For b ! 0 our economy has ‡exible prices and a unique equilibrium in which the Friedman rule is the optimal policy. The pro…t di¤erentials can be expressed as 8 :
In equilibrium, sticky-and ‡exible-price …rms make the same pro…ts: 2 j q=1 = 1 j q=1 = 0. Thus in internal equilibria, no …rms will choose to revise their prices and 1 = 2 = .
For q 6 = 1, monetary authority decisions can induce positive pro…ts di¤er-ential and a¤ect the degree of price stickiness in the economy. Credit-goods …rms with sticky prices have a bigger incentive to reoptimize, since they face a higher demand, which is positively related to the interest rate (R 1), i.e., 2 1 . This implies that more credit-goods …rms revise their price (^ 2 ^ 1 ) and that the degree of price stickiness is lower for credit-goods producers ( 2 1 ). The candidate equilibria in our model for b 2 (0; +1) are di¤erent from those in the model of Albanesi et al. (2003) . The monetary authority takes into account the e¤ect of its decision on the degree of stickiness in the economy. In particular, this a¤ects the possibility of pro…table deviations. We illustrate this point in the following section.
Computing Equilibria
In this section we explore the properties of our model for intermediate values of b using numerical examples and perform sensitivity analysis.
We compute the equilibria, setting the fraction of credit goods, the upper bound on the fraction of sticky-price …rms, productivity, government spend- Figure 1 portrays the monetary authority's objective function for the lowin ‡ation candidate equilibrium, as a function of b and q. Notice that for any b, the maximum utility is achieved for q = 1. In words, in our model the low-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium. Changes in b have a second-order e¤ect on the allocations (see Figure 2) . Figure 3 shows the utility surface corresponding to the high-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium. For any b, a local maximum is achieved at q = 1. Again, the allocations for corresponding to q = 1 do not change much as b decreases (Figure 4) . However, for a su¢ ciently small b, the monetary authority's ability to tinker with the economy's degree of stickiness generates a pro…table deviation. Playing the lowest possible q compatible with the non-negativity constraint on the interest rate delivers a higher utility than at the local optimum q = 1. That is, for a low enough b the high-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium is no longer an equilibrium. Figure 5 compares the allocations at the local maximum q = 1 (gray dotted lines) with the allocations at the global maximum (solid black lines), as functions of b. For b < b = 25; 375:39, the endogeneity of sticky prices induces a pro…table deviation. Notice that the deviation involves lowering the interest rate as much as possible (R = 1). When the government deviates to the Friedman rule, it increases the relative price of sticky-price goods, i.e. lowers q: The bene…t of such a deviation is the elimination of the distortion between cash and credit goods and does not depend on b. The cost, which is the distortion between sticky and ‡exible …rms, declines as b declines. The lower b is, the higher the fraction of …rms that reset their prices and the lower the fraction of …rms that produce at highly ine¢ cient levels.
At b , around 1 percent of the …rms which originally had sticky prices pay the price-revision cost and switch to ‡exible pricing. The gains from resetting prices will be 3,650 percent increase in pro…ts. In order to sustain the high-in ‡ation equilibrium, the distribution of the menu costs should be such that 99 percent of the sticky-price …rms have menu costs higher than 3,650 percent of their pro…ts. To put these numbers in perspective, note that Levy et al. (1997) put the average cost of price adjustment for U.S. supermarket chains to 0.7 percent of revenues, while the calibration of the menu cost function in Golosov and Lucas (2007) , based on Klenow and Kryvstov (2005) , implies that the average cost of price adjustment is 0.5 percent of total revenues.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we explore how b and the corresponding degree of price stickiness change as (the initial degree of price stickiness) and z (the fraction of cash goods) vary. We consider the two values of z in Albanesi et al. (2003) . Figure 6 displays b , the lowest value of b for which the high-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium is an equilibrium, as a function of the initial measure of sticky-price …rms for the two values of z we consider. The higher is the initial degree of price stickiness in our model, the more robust is the high-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium. For the highest values of for which the high-in ‡ation equilibrium exists, the value of b is 123, for z = 0:15 and 108, for z = 0:13. At these values of b the government is indi¤erent between deviating to Friedman rule or validating the expectations and delivering q = 1: The gains for stickyprice …rms from resetting their prices remain extremely high (see Figure 7) : about 264 percent (if z = 0:15) and 300 percent (if z = 0:13). Figure 8 displays the degree of price stickiness that the monetary authority's deviation from the high-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium would induce. The higher is, the lower the degree of stickiness associated to a pro…table deviation. In order for the high-in ‡ation candidate equilibrium to be an equilibrium the distribution of menu costs should be such that at least 7 (8.3) percent of all …rms in the economy face a menu cost higher 300 (264) percent of their pro…ts for z = 0:13 (z = 0:5). These values are orders of magnitude higher then those estimated by Levy et al. (1997) or inferred by Golosov and Lucas (2007) .
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Conclusions
The expectation traps hypothesis has been advocated in the literature as a possible explanation for episodes of high in ‡ation. Albanesi et al. (2003) present a model where the expectation trap is sprung by sticky-price …rms posting high prices because of high expected in ‡ation. We generalize their model by allowing sticky-price …rms to revise their price in response to the monetary authority's action by paying a menu cost. For reasonable parametrizations, our model has a unique low-in ‡ation equilibrium.
In response to high in ‡ation, lowering the interest rate would eliminate the distortion between cash and credit goods. In Albanesi et al. (2003) stickyprice …rms would remain stuck with high prices and the resulting distortion in the allocations is so costly as to support a high-in ‡ation equilibrium. In our model, the allocation distortion cost is undone by sticky-price …rms becoming ‡exible pricers and deviating to the Friedman rule is optimal. In our model, the possibility for …rms to protect themselves against high in ‡ation by revising their pricing decision unwinds the expectation trap. This rules out episodes of high in ‡ation driven by non-fundamental uncertainty. However, the lack of commitment is still costly because it induces the monetary authority to deliver higher-than-optimal in ‡ation. 
